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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
admitted directly rather than continuing to sanction the same result achieved
by less respectful means.
CHARLES SAWYER
TAXATION---'OERNIHT RULE" OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE IS VALID UNDER § 162(a) (2) OF INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
Respondent was a traveling salesman for a wholesale grocery company in
Tennessee. He lived in Fountain City, Tennessee, about 450 miles from his
employer's place of business. The respondent would customarily leave his
residence about 5 a.m. in order to be in his sales territory at the start of the
business day. He-ordinarily traveled a total of 150 to 175 miles daily, returning
home by 5:30 p.m. The respondent ate breakfast and lunch on the road in
customers' restaurants. On his income tax returns for 1960 and 1961 he deducted
the cost of these meals as traveling expenses "while away from home" under
section 162 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction and the respondent paid the tax. Suing for a refund
in the District Court, the taxpayer received a verdict in his favor, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.2 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that the "sleep or rest" rule of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, allowing a deduction for the cost of
meals only when the taxpayer is away from home overnight, is valid under
section 162(a) (2). United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
The Revenue Act of 1918 allowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary
business expenses.3 At first, this provision was strictly construed as denying any
deduction for "traveling expenses" such as meals and lodging, unless these
expenses could be deemed within the "ordinary and necessary" language of the
Act.4 Later, however, taking a more liberal view, the Treasury Department
allowed a deduction of such traveling expenses "in excess of any expenditure
ordinarily required for such purposes at home." In a further liberalization
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(2) reads in part:
(a) In General: There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including-
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business;
2. 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
3. Rev. Act of 1918, § 214(a) (1), 40 Stat. 1066, reads in part:
(a) That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year in carrying on any trade or business ....
4. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1920 ed.).
5. T.D. 3101, 1920-3 Cum. Bull. 191.
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of the policy, the Revenue Act of 1921 provided a specific deduction for
"traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodg-
ing) while away from home in pursuit of a trade or business." 6 This provision
has been carried over into the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes and has
remained substantially unchanged.7
The concept of traveling away from home has been a major cause of con-
troversy in the allowance of a deduction for traveling expenses. Much of this
controversy has centered around the meaning of "home" for purposes of the
statute. Even prior to the 1921 Act, "home" was construed for purposes of a
traveling expense deduction both in its ordinary sense as a permanent residence,
and also as meaning business headquarters.8 As early as 1927, the Board of
Tax Appeals held that the provision in the 1921 Act was intended to permit a
deduction for traveling expenses incurred while the taxpayer was away from
his post of duty or place of employment.9 The word home thus became a term
with a meaning different from its normal usage as residence, domicile, or
dwelling place, and the concept of a "tax home" was created.
The Commissioner has continually followed this rationale, stating that "a
taxpayer's home for purposes of [section 162 (a) (2)] is located at the place
where he conducts his trade or business,' ° and the courts have usually upheld
this determination." However, in Wallace v. Commissioner,12 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the "tax home" doctrine and held that the traveling
expenses of a taxpayer who regularly lived in San Francisco, but visited Los
Angeles for long periods on business, met the statutory requirement that
traveling expenses be incurred while away from home. In Wallace, the court
stated unequivocally that "home" as used in the statute should be given its
6. Rev. Act of 1921, § 214(a) (1).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A), 53 Stat. 12; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
162 (a) (2). The only change has been to delete the words "entire amount" and in lieu thereof
to allow a deduction for the amounts expended for meals and lodging "other than amounts
which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances." Rev. Act of 1962, § 4 b, 26
U.S.C. 162.
8. The concept that a business trip must be away from one's permanent residence
and also away from his business headquarters is found in two service pronouncements
prior to the 1921 Act. See, T.I). 3101, 1920-3 Cum. Bull. 191; O1). 864, 1921-4 Cum. Bull.
211, 212.
9. Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
10. Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 75, 77. Where a taxpayer is engaged in busi-
ness in two or more separate localities, his "home" is deemed to be at his principal or
regular post of duty. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 56-49, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 152; Rev. Rul.
60-189, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 60 (taxpayer is not "away from home" if he has no home for
traveling expense purposes, which is his principal or regular place of employment.); Rev.
Rul. 60-314, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 48; I.T. 3314, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 152.
11. See Frank N. Smith, 21 T.C. 991 (1954), [Place of business was "home" for pur-
poses of determining whether taxpayer was "traveling away from home" and any transporta-
tion expenses within the area of such "home" were not deductible under the 1939 Code.];
Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1920) [For tax purposes, an individuals home means his
place of business or post at which he is employed.]; Fred G. Armstrong, 43 T.C. 733 (1965),
[When movement of the place where a railroad worker performs his duties is the only
"travel" involved, he is not in a travel status for purposes of § 162(a) (2).].
12. 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944).
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ordinary and usual meaning.13 A chance to resolve the conflict as to the meaning
of "home" was before the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Flowers.14 In that
case, the Court set forth three conditions which must be satisfied before a
traveling expense deduction would be allowed under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of
the 1939 Code.15 However, the Court found it unnecessary to define "home,"
as it was decided that there was no direct connection between the taxpayer's
expenditures and the carrying on of his employer's business. Therefore, the
expenses of the taxpayer incurred in traveling from the city of his residence
to the city where his office was located were not deductible under the statute.' 0
The Tax Court recognized situations where the "tax home" doctrine would be
too restrictive, and recognized an exception to it in situations where the tax-
payer's employment "away from home" was temporary, in which case a deduc-
tion was allowed for expenses, including meals and lodging, incurred at his
temporary post of duty.17 Where the employment was "indefinite," however, a
deduction was denied.' 8
A second opportunity to clarify the "home" controversy arose in Peurifoy
v. Commissioner,'9 before the Supreme Court on the question of the scope of
the "temporary" employment exception. However, no such clarification was
forthcoming, and the Court merely assumed the validity of the temporary-
indefinite rule, specifically avoiding a definition of the word "home." The
Commissioner accepted this distinction, and has merely recognized it as an
exception to his rule that a taxpayer's home is his place of employment or
principal post of duty in determining if he is away from home for purposes of
section 162 (a) (2).20
For purposes of the traveling expense deduction, the problem of "home"
is coupled with the consideration of the "overnight rule."21 The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the courts have been in conflict over this rule almost
since the introduction of the provision allowing the deduction. Under the 1939
13. Id. at 410.
14. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
15. (1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary travel expense as that term
is generally understood. This includes such items as transportation, food and lodging
expenses incurred while traveling. (2) The expense must be incurred "while away from
home." (3) The expense must be incurred in the pursuit of business. A direct connection is
required between the expenditure and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer
or his employer. Id. at 470.
16. Id. at 473.
17. Walter F. Brown, 13 B.TA. 832 (1928); Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763
(2d Cir. 1943).
18. Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 (1949).
19. 358 U.S. 59 (1958), aff'g 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Harvey v. Commis-
sioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960) (The Court applied the temporary-indefinite rule, with
no definition of "home."); Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962).
20. Rev. Rul. 55-604, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 49; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. Bull.
60, 62; Rev. RuL 60-314, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 48; Rev. Rul. 61-95, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 749;
Rev. Rul. 63-64, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 30.
21. See Rev. Rul. 54-479, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 76; Note, 1962 Duke L.J. Rev. 497.
See generally, Note, 38 N.D. Law. 447, 457 (1963).
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Code, the Commissioner disallowed expense deductions for transportation,
meals and lodging, unless the taxpayer was away from home overnight in the
pursuit of a trade or business.22 However, as far as transportation was con-
cerned, the courts overruled the Commissioner and allowed a deduction for the
expense, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer was not away from home
overnight.23 These allowances were based mainly on what the courts called the
"plain, ordinary and popular sense of the statute," which had no such overnight
rule written into it.24 In Chandler v. Commissioner,25 the court allowed the
taxpayer to deduct the cost of transportation from his home2 6 to his secondary
place of employment as traveling expenses while away from home, even though
the taxpayer was not away from home overnight. The court refused to accept
the Commissioner's overnight rule, stating that it was "more in the nature of
legislation than interpretation, and accordingly .. .beyond the rule-making
authority of the Internal Revenue Service." 27 The constant refusal of the courts
to adopt the Commissioner's interpretation with respect to the deduction for
transportation expenses led to the ruling that such deductions under the 1939
Code would no longer be contested 2 8 Under the 1954 Code, this problem does
not arise. A deduction is now allowed for business transportation expenses even
though these expenses are neither reimbursable by the employer nor incurred
while traveling away from home.29
Under section 162 (a) (2) meals and lodging are also included among travel
expenses. Lodging ordinarily presents no unusual problems,30 but the deduction
for meal expenses has been the subject of much litigation. The Commissioner
has considered the two expenses conjunctively,3 1 and has allowed a deduction for
meal expenses only when the taxpayer is required to take lodging as well.3 2 On
trips where the taxpayer was away from home, for purposes of deducting transpor-
tation expenses, and yet not away from home overnight, the Commissioner has
ruled that the meal expenses were personal, and not deductible.3 3 The Tax Court
22. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(n)(2).
23. Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949); Scott v. KeIm, 110 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Minn.
1953); Horace E. Podems, 24 T.C. 21 (1955). See also Frank N. Smith, 21 T.C. 991 (1954).
24. Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414, 416 (1949).
25. 226 F.2d (1st Cir. 1955).
26. The taxpayer's home and place of business were located in the same vicinity.Hereinafter, "home" will be referred to in its more technical sense, as principal place of
employment.
27. 226 F.2d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1955). The court also stated that overnight should
not be the "definitive minimum limit short of which the statutory requirement could notbe met as a matter of law." Id. See also Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959).
28. Rev. Rul. 60-147, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 682.
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 162, 62(2)(C). See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 9,
69 (1953); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 9, A-19 (1953). See also Huffaker, 22 Inst. on
Fed. Taxation 869, 876 (1964); Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 87.
30. If lodging is required by the taxpayer, it is evident that he has been "away fromhome overnight," under the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute, and the deduction
is permitted. See, e.g., Joseph H. Sherman, Jr., 16 T.C. 332 (1951).
31. See generally Huffaker, supra note 29.
32. See I.T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 64.
33. See generally Haddleton, Traveling Expenses "Away from Home," 17 Tax L. Rev.
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has generally supported the Commissioner's determination, usually on a basis
that the taxpayer who purchases a meal during a one-day business trip is essen-
tially in the same position as the taxpayer who does not travel, and is merely
unable to have one of his meals at home.34 In Williams v. Patterson,85 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to comply with the overnight
rule, stating that such a rule has no basis in the statute or in the congressional
intent behind the statute.36 However, the court in a sense formulated a "sleep
or rest" rule which was not too far removed from the Commissioner's rule. Ac-
cording to the Williams court, the taxpayer would be allowed a deduction for
traveling expenses if it was reasonable for him to be released from his duties to
obtain substantial sleep or rest "in order to meet the exigencies of his employer
or the business demands of his employment. 37 In essence, the Commissioner's
rule had not been abandoned, and he therefore acquiesced in this modification.38
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Hanson v.
Commissioner,39 held that the overnight rule, even in its modified form, was
not a viable concept.40 Noting that neither Congress nor the regulations had
ever used the word "overnight" in connection with travel expenses,41 the court
concluded that the overnight rule was simply "arbitrary line-drawing having no
basis in the statute . ,,42 Consequently, the taxpayer was permitted to deduct
the cost of his meals on a one-day business trip. The Commissioner adhered to
his position, however, and refused to follow the Hanson decision.43 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently adopted the Commissioner's position.
Bagley v. Commissioner44 involved a taxpayer who normally traveled from 70 to
261 (1962). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 34; Rev. Rul. 60-147, 1960-1
Cum. Bull. 682; Rev. Rul. 56-508, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 126. See also Joseph M. Winn, 32
T.C. 220 (1959); Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949).
34. See Fred Marion Osteen, 14 T.C. 1261, 1262 (1950); Al J. Smith, 33 T.C. 861, 862(1960); Summerour v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 318 (D.C. Ga. 1951). See also Louis Drill, 8 T.C.
903 (1947).
35. 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
36. Id. at 335.
37. Id. at 340. See also David G. Anderson, 18 T.C. 649 (1952), wherein the Tax
Court had allowed the traveling expense deduction for a taxpayer who was a railroad
employee. However, he was not on a "turn-around run" between his home and away from
home terminals, and was released from his duties to obtain rest during the layover before
the return trip. But see Sam J. Herrin, 28 T.C. 1303 (1957), where the deduction wasdenied for a taxpayer on a "turn-around run" even though he was away from his home
terminal for a period substantially longer than an average workday, yet was not required to
obtain sleep or rest prior to completion of the journey.
38. Rev. Rul. 61-221, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 34.
39. 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962). See generally Mott, Eighth Circuit Deals Blow to
IRS Rule Disallowing Meals Unless "away overnight," 16 J. Taxation 308 (1962).
40. 298 F.2d, at 396.
41. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(a), 1.162-17(b)(3)(ii), (b)(4), (c)(2) [19673. Any
reference to "overnight" in these sections seems to be mainly incidental, and concerned pri-
marily with the question of reimbursements. The "overnight" references do not refer to
the allowance of at traveling expense deduction.
42. 298 F.2d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 1962).
43. Rev. Rul. 63-239, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 87. See generally Steiner, IRS Will not
Abandon "Overnight" Rule Despite Recent Court Defeats, 19 J. Taxation 370 (1963).
44. Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
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150 miles daily, and ate all his meals away from home. The court stressed the
complexity of the problems involved with the application of section 162 (a) (2)
and reasoned that a line must be drawn in distinguishing between the expense
for meals as a personal expense and as a business expense.4 5 The court felt that
no other practical test had been offered by either the Hanson court46 or the Court
of Appeals in Correll.47 Consequently, the Bagley court adhered to the Commis-
sioner's overnight rule as the fairest and most convenient test of determining
when a taxpayer is "away from home" for purposes of section 162 (a) (2) .4
Prior to United States v. Correll,49 the Supreme Court had never ruled on
the question of the deduction of meal expenses by a taxpayer on a non-overnight
business trip. Speaking for the majority in Correll, Justice Stewart maintained
that the Commissioner's overnight rule avoids wasteful litigation and uncertainty
inherent in a purely case-by-case approach, though the rule does make some
arbitrary distinctions."0 According to the Supreme Court, the overnight rule
has achieved ease and certainty of application of the statute, as well as sub-
stantial fairness. It places all one-day travelers on a similar footing, rather than
discriminating against intracity travelers and commuters who cannot deduct
the cost of the meals they eat on the road.51 The Court saw only those taxpayers
who must stop for sleep or rest as incurring significantly higher living expenses,
and therefore was willing to extend the provisions of section 162 (a) (2) only
to these people.5 2 Justice Douglas dissented,53 claiming that the statute speaks
only in terms of geography. The implementation of a rule injecting a time ele-
ment into the words "away from home" was not intended by the statute, and
is unrelated to the question of whether travel expenses are related to the tax-
payer's business.54
It is apparent that the Supreme Court has attempted to justify the over-
night rule as the most practical and convenient manner of administering justice
under the statute. However, an important point in the controversy surrounding
the deduction of meal expenses under section 162 (a) (2) was not considered by
the Court in Correll. That is, the traveling expense deduction was added to the
Internal Revenue Code as a liberalizing provision, allowing the specific deduc-
tion of meal and lodging expenses where no such deduction had previously been
allowed.5 5 The businessman who travels must ordinarily incur expenses which
either duplicate or are greater than those incurred at home. Consequently, to
relieve such a taxpayer from some of the added burdens of carrying on his
45. Id. at 207.
46. 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
47. 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966).
48. 374 F.2d 204, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1967).
49. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
50. Id. at 302.
51. Id. at 303.
52. Id. at 304-0.
53. Black & Fortas, JJ., concurring with Douglas, J.
54. Id. at 307.
55. See text accompanying supra notes 5-7.
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business, Congress saw fit to allow him to deduct the extra cost of his business
travel. The overnight rule as it has been formulated has what appears to be an
unjustifiable limiting effect on the statute. The rule, stated the Court, "places
all one-day travelers on a similar tax footing,"56 thereby obviating the necessity
of determining whether the taxpayer was really away from home as required by
the statute, or was merely a commuter or an intracity traveler." It is sub-
mitted, however, that if a meal expense deduction is to be allowed the distinction
between the commuter and the one-day traveler must be made. The taxpayer who
travels for one day is as much within the statutory language as is the overnight
traveler. The arbitrary overnight rule bears no relation to whether a taxpayer
is "away from home" for purposes of section 162. In fact, the Court never
attempted to justify the overnight rule as the proper means of determining
when a taxpayer is away from home, but only as the most practical adminis-
trative test.5 8
Continuing its attempted justification of the overnight rule, the Correll
Court stated that "only the taxpayer who must stop for sleep or rest incurs
significantly higher living expenses. . ... 9 and, therefore, only this taxpayer
should be allowed the deduction for his meal expenses. It would appear that
the overnight traveler's expenses differ from those of the one-day traveler only
by the amount expended for lodging; the expense for meals does differ not too
greatly between the two. Consequently, if this "justification" of the overnight
rule were to be carried to its logical conclusion, all meal expense deductions
should be denied. Only a deduction for the expenses of lodging should be per-
mitted under this rationale, since it is this expense which supposedly causes the
overnight traveler's expenses to be so much higher than those of the one-day
traveler.6 0
It has been suggested that the meal expense deduction be limited to a deduc-
tion for the cost of meals in excess of what would have been expended had the
taxpayer remained at home.61 Prior to the enactment of what is now section
56. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
57. Under the Flowers rationale, the commuter is not traveling away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business. His expenses are not a matter of business necessity, but
rather, a matter of personal preference in his choice of residence. But cf. Wright v. Hartsell,
305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962). The intra-city traveler receives a deduction for his transporta-
tion expenses under the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, but is not entitled to a deduction for his
meal expenses since he is not "away from home" when he merely travels in the same general
vicinity of his business headquarters.
58. The Court itself mentioned that there may be other tests which could be employed
in determining whether the taxpayer is away from home. "For example, respondent suggested
that § 162(a) (2) be construed to include taxpayers who travel away from their home town
or outside the ... metropolitan area" of their residence. 389 U.S. at 303 n.14.
59. Id. at 304-05.
60. It is conceivable that the traveler who is on the road several days a week, and
must purchase his meals, but does not stay away overnight would incur significantly higher
living expenses than the traveler who is away overnight only once or twice during the week.
Is it therefore the amount of time spent traveling which really determines which traveler
would have higher expenses, not whether or not he must spend money for lodging.
61. Mott, supra note 39, at 309.
RECENT CASES
162 (a) (2), the Commissioner had promulgated a regulation to that effect.6 2
However, the difficulties involved in calculating the "excess" under this regula-
tion proved so onerous that Congress was persuaded to grant a deduction for
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging.63 This, in turn, led to the
implementation of the overnight rule as a means of administering the statute.
It is submitted that the overnight rule, though perhaps having its adminis-
trative advantages, is nevertheless an inequitable solution to the problem con-
sidered herein. Recognizing the inherently personal nature of meals, regardless
of where or when consumed, perhaps the better solution would be to deny the
meal expense deduction to all taxpayers, and allow only a deduction for the
expenses of transportation and lodging. A deduction for meal expenses seems to
bear no relation to the extra burden of expense which the statute is designed to
alleviate. A taxpayer must eat, and would incur this meal expense whether he
remained at home, or traveled. The expense for meals on a business trip, whether
for one day or overnight, is not a duplication of any expense, as a lodging expense
is for a taxpayer on an overnight trip.64 Consequently, the denial of a deduction
for meals, as being a personal expense, would not be unjust. In fact, it is diffi-
cult to perceive how this inherently personal expense becomes a "business" or
"travel" expense simply because it is incurred away from home.
The distinction between the one-day traveler and the overnight traveler
seems unwarranted under the present wording of the statute. A clarification of
the language by Congress particularly as to what is meant by "away from
home," would enable the Commissioner and the courts to formulate a more
positive test for administering the statute, and allowing the deduction for travel
expenses.
MARY E. BISANTZ
62. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1920 ed,).
63. Rev. Act of 1921, § 214(a)(1), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. See also Commissioner v.
Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1967).
64. Lodging may be a personal expense, but is always a duplication of an expense
incurred by the taxpayer at home, regardless of whether he travels. That is, the taxpayer
who travels and must incur a lodging expense on the overnight trip still has a lodging
expense at his home, for that same period. It is this duplication of expense that the statute
is designed to prevent.
